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Abstract
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21 Introduction
Probably the most frequent source for two person bargaining problems are object division
problems. Two agents are entitled to divide a set of objects among themselves. Examples are
easily found in divorce cases or the division of real estate among two heirs. Although seemingly
different, the scenario in which two parties bargain over different issues, each of which can be
solved by choosing one option, also falls in the class of problems we want to study.
The literature offers a couple of solution procedures to solve this kind of conflict. Thereby,
different procedures implement solutions that exhibit different properties. For example, the
“Adjusted Winner” Procedure as discussed in Brams & Taylor (1996) yields an equitable and
envy-free solution. It implements the axiomatic bargaining solution introduced by Kalai &
Smorodinsky (1975).
While most existing procedures start with an allocation of objects that is modified during the
course of the procedure, the aim in this paper is to determine allocations by means of a market
procedure. Roughly spoken, this means that we want to resolve the object division conflict by
letting both agents choose their bundle of objects separately. For this, we attach prices to the
different objects, endow agents with initial income and then let them spend their incomes on
the different items. the advantage is that once prices are fixed, the agents do not have to enter
another round of negotiation. In fact, there is a decentralization of the conflict through prices.
The final allocation is simply achieved after a utility maximization exercise.
Clearly, the first question to be asked is how to set the prices that this procedure works. Here
it turns out that object prices have to satisfy a simple condition that ensures that there will be
no further conflict about who will receive which item. In other words, such prices constitute
Walrasian equilibrium prices in a derived market. And, since the allocation that prevails will
be a Walrasian equilibrium, it constitutes an efficient allocation of the objects.
A second goal in the paper is to use this market procedure to implement known axiomatic
bargaining solutions. This can be accomplished by choosing the right prices and applying the
procedure. As we will see, this may involve iteration. But still, once an object is allocated to
some party, it will stay there during the course of action. We are able to provide implementation
results for the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution, the discrete Raiffa solution and the solution by
Perles & Maschler (1981b). The latter is axiomatized by the superadditivity axiom, which has
an appealing interpretation in our context. It says that neither of the parties is willing to split
the whole set of objects into smaller ones and proceed over each of them separately, since there
will be no benefits for neither one. So, the superadditivity notion removes one potential source
of conflict, i.e. the question how to proceed. Surprisingly, this solution is implementable by
applying the market procedure only once.
3The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 provides the basic framework and discusses demand
correspondences. In Section 3 we discuss the condition that ensures existence of Walrasian
equilibria. The basic market procedure as well as three of its specifications are presented in
Section 4. Here implementation results appear. Section 5 concludes.
2 The Framework
We consider a fair division problem in which two agents may divide a finite list of (desirable)
objects (goods) among themselves. Denote by K := {1, . . . K} the set of objects. Although
we think of the objects as indivisible ones, we will assume that they are perfectly divisible.
However, it is well known, that in our setup any efficient division of K involves a split of at
most one object.
Therefore, we will also consider the set X
K
:= [0, 1]K of assignments to an agent. Furthermore,
we assume that preferences over (complete) objects can be represented by vNM utility functions
ui : K −→ R (i = 1, 2) and that both agents have linear utilities over divisions of an object.
Finally, we want to assume that utility functions are additively separable across goods. These
assumptions determine agents utility functions on X
K
, which should be expressed by mappings
U i : X
K −→ R (i = 1, 2) with U i(xi) := ∑k∈K ui(k)xik (xi ∈ XK), which reflect i’s utility
over assignments.
An allocation is a pair (x1, x2) ∈ XK × XK of assignments such that ∑i=1,2 xik = 1 for each
k ∈ K holds true. Let ∆ denote the set of price systems p ∈ RK+ satisfying
∑
k∈K pk = 1. Then
the value of an assignment xi under price system p is the inner product p · x.
We start with agent i’s demand correspondence which is defined by ϕ : ∆× R+ =⇒ XK with
ϕi(p,m) = argmax
{∑
k∈K
ui(k)xik |xi ∈ XK, p · xi ≤ m
}
(i = 1, 2),
where m corresponds to the agent’s endowment in “money / value”. In the present context,
agent i’s maximization problem is solved by first ordering the objects in K by their ratios
ui(k)/pk, which reflect “utility per dollar”. Then agent 1 demands the objects according to
such an order until his budget is exhausted. Here linearity guarantees that an agent prefers to
obtain an object entirely, before he wants to have (fractions of another one).
Denote by SK the set of all permutations of goods, i.e. all bijective mappings from K onto K.
4Let
Πi(p) :=
{
pi ∈ SK | u
i(pi−1(j))
ppi−1(j)
≥ u
i(pi−1(j + 1))
ppi−1(j+1)
(j = 1, . . . , K − 1)
}
be the set of permutations, such that agent i’s utilities per dollar at prices p are ordered non-
increasingly. Note that Πi(p) contains more than one element, if there are at least two goods
with equal ratios. Yet, any two elements pi, pi′ ∈ Πi(p) are equivalent in the sense that they
satisfy the condition
ui(pi−1(j))
ppi−1(j)
>
ui(pi−1(k))
ppi−1(k)
⇐⇒ u
i(pi′−1(j))
ppi′−1(j)
>
ui(pi′−1(k))
ppi′−1(k)
for all j, k ∈ K.
To compute agent i’s demand along the order pi ∈ Πi(p) with budget m, one can determine
the maximal number Jpi such that
∑Jpi
j=1 ppi−1(j) · 1 ≤ m is satisfied. That is, agent i can afford
objects pi−1(1) to pi−1(Jpi) and will spend the remaining money to buy a fraction of object
pi−1(Jpi + 1). So, his demand for each object k ∈ K at order pi is given by
(1) (ϕi,pi(p,m))k = 1{pi−1(1),...,pi−1(Jpi)}(k) +
m−
Jpi∑
j=1
ppi−1(j)
ppi−1(Jpi+1)
· 1{pi−1(Jpi+1)}(k) (k ∈ K).
Since Πi(p) is not necessarily single valued, we have as demand correspondence
ϕi(p,m) =
{
ϕi,pi(p,m) |pi ∈ Πi(p)} .
Any object division problem generates a two-person bargaining problem in the following way:
Status quo points will always be the origin. For k ∈ K let V k := compH(cvH({(u1(k), 0), (0, u2(k))}))
be the set of possible utility allocations arising from the division of good k. This includes the
possibility of free disposal. With additive separability of utilities, the bargaining problem aris-
ing from an object division problem is represented by the sum V =
∑
k∈K V
k. We will denote
the class of associated bargaining problems by U . Note that the class of bargaining problems
generated by object division problems is the class of compactly generated polyhedral games.
See, for example, Perles & Maschler (1981b) or Rosenmu¨ller (2000). Conversely, any polyhedral
bargaining game canonically corresponds to a market, in which no two goods j and k admit
of the same ratio, i.e., u
i(j)
ui(k)
= u
3−i(j)
u3−i(k) . This market shall be called standard representation (of
V ∈ U).
We will call a mapping ϕ : U −→ R2 a bargaining solution on U , if for every V ∈ U the point
ϕ(V ) is Pareto efficient and individual rational (i.e. here, ϕ(V ) ≥ 0). Moreover ϕ is supposed
to satisfy the symmetry axiom and be covariant with affine transformations of utility.1
1For a discussion of these axioms see,e.g., Peters (1992).
53 Walrasian Equilibria
To analyze the object division problem, we set up a two-agent Walrasian exchange economy E
for the objects in K. Thus, the commodity space is XK. Agents’ preferences are represented by
the utility functions U i (i = 1, 2). Initial endowments are denoted by (ω1, ω2) ∈ [0, 1]K× [0, 1]K .
Thus, the tuple E = (K, U1, U2, ω1, ω2) describes the economy.
Note that existence of Walrasian equilibria in E is guaranteed, since utility functions are in par-
ticular concave. Moreover, due to monotonicity of utility functions, any Walrasian equilibrium
is efficient according to the First Welfare Theorem.
Define an operation ∗ : SK −→ SK by pi 7→ pi∗ with pi∗(l) := K + 1 − pi(l). This operation
simply “reverses the order” in pi. By straightforward computations, one checks pi∗−1(q) =
pi−1(K + 1− q).
The market clearing condition in equilibrium can be established for all price systems, such that
the orders according to which agents demand goods are inverse to each other. Such a price will
then establish an equilibrium price, which is independent of the initial endowment.
To make this precise, we introduce the following condition:
Definition 1
(i) For i = 1, 2, j, k ∈ K with ui(k) 6= 0 denote by sijk := u
i(j)
ui(k)
agent i’s substitution rate
between objects j and k.
(ii) We say p ∈ ∆ satisfies the reversed order condition (REVORD), if
(2)
pj
pk
∈ [min (s1jk, s2jk) ,max (s1jk, s2jk)]
holds for all j, k ∈ K with pk, u1(k), u2(k) 6= 0.
Then we can show that REVORD induces reversed orders.
Lemma 1
A price system p¯ ∈ ∆ satisfies REVORD if and only if there exists a pair (pi1, pi2) ∈ Π1(p¯)×Π2(p¯)
with pi1 = (pi2)∗.
Proof:
Step 1 Necessity: If p¯ = λui(k) ∈ ∆ for all k ∈ K, appropriate λ > 0 and some i then
6the assertion is obvious, since here Πi(p¯) = SK holds. Suppose that this is not the case and
Assume there is no such pair as claimed. Then for every pi ∈ Π1(p¯) there exist j′, k′ ∈ K with
pi∗(j′) > pi∗(k′) and
(3)
u2(j′)
u2(k′)
= s2j′k′ >
p¯j′
p¯k′
,
u1(j′)
u1(k′)
= s1j′k′ >
p¯j′
p¯k′
holds. The assumption p¯ 6= λui(·) guarantees that strict inequality holds for some pi ∈ Π1(p¯).
The two inequalities imply
p¯j′
p¯k′
< min
(
s1j′k′ , s
2
j′k′
)
which contradicts REVORD.
Step 2: Suppose REVORD is not satisfied. Then there exist jˆ, kˆ ∈ K with
(i)
p¯jˆ
p¯kˆ
< s1
jˆkˆ
=
u1(jˆ)
u1(kˆ)
, (ii)
p¯jˆ
p¯kˆ
< s2
jˆkˆ
=
u2(jˆ)
u2(kˆ)
(or analogously with both strict inequalities in the reverse direction). For pi ∈ Π1(p¯), (i) implies
pi(jˆ) < pi(kˆ). Hence, pi∗(jˆ) = K + 1 − pi(jˆ) > K + 1 − pi(kˆ) = pi∗(kˆ) follows, which in view of
(ii) shows pi∗ 6∈ Π2(p¯). This shows that there is no pair (pi, pi∗) ∈ Π1(p¯)× Π2(p¯). 2
Lemma 1 states that the orders according to which agents demand their objects are inverse, if
and only if price ratios are always located between the agents’ substitution rates. By “inverse”
we mean that we could line up the objects and agent 1 starts to demand on the left whereas
agent 2’s demand goes from right to left. Thus, there is (up to indifferences) no contradiction
on how to distribute the objects in an exchange economy.
Theorem 1
Let E be an exchange economy as above and let p¯ ∈ ∆ satisfy REVORD.
Then for any initial endowment (ω1, ω2) there exists an allocation x¯ in E such that x¯i ∈
ϕi(p¯, p¯ ωi). Hence, the pair (x¯, p¯) constitutes a Walrasian equilibrium. In particular, p¯ is an
equilibrium price vector, independent of initial endowments.
Proof:
Let p¯ satisfy REVORD. Take an arbitrary pi ∈ Π1(p¯) with pi∗ ∈ Π2(p¯). We show that markets
are cleared under prices p¯ and along orders (pi, pi∗) (cf. (1)). According to (pi, pi∗) the aggregate
7demand (for all goods) is2
ϕ1,pi(p¯, p¯ ω1) + ϕ2,pi
∗
(p¯, p¯ ω2)
=
Jpi∑
j=1
epi
−1(j) +
p¯ ω1 −
Jpi∑
j=1
p¯pi−1(j)
p¯pi−1(Jpi+1)
epi
−1(Jpi+1) +
Npi∑
l=1
epi
∗−1(l) +
p¯ ω2 −
Npi∑
l=1
p¯pi∗−1(l)
p¯pi∗−1(Npi+1)
epi
∗−1(Npi+1)
=
Jpi∑
j=1
epi
−1(j) +
K∑
l=K+1−Npi
epi
−1(l) +
p¯ ω1 −
Jpi∑
j=1
p¯pi−1(j)
p¯pi−1(Jpi+1)
epi
−1(Jpi+1) +
p¯ ω2 −
K∑
l=K+1−Npi
p¯pi−1(l)
p¯pi−1(K−Npi)
epi
−1(K−Npi).
So, agent 1 demands goods pi−1(1), . . . , pi−1(Jpi) completely and spends his remaining income
on object pi−1(Jpi + 1). Analogously, Npi is given for the second agent. We have to show that
either Jpi +Npi = |K| (in case p¯ ω1 −
Jpi∑
j=1
p¯pi−1(j) = p¯ ω
2 −
Npi∑
l=1
p¯pi−1(l) = 0) or J
pi +Npi = |K| − 1
(in the remaining case) holds true3.
Suppose to the contrary Jpi +Npi > K. Then ϕ1,pi(p¯, p¯ ω1) + ϕ2,pi∗(p¯, p¯ ω2) > (1, . . . , 1) (strictly
at least in coordinate Jpi). Therefore, p¯
(
ϕ1,pi(p¯, p¯ ω1) + ϕ2,pi
∗
(p¯, p¯ ω2)
)
> p¯ (ω1 + ω2) which
contradicts at least one budget constraint.
The remaining cases can be excluded using similar arguments. Observe that for any pi ∈ Π1(p¯)
(with pi∗ ∈ Π2(p¯)) the allocation x¯ = (ϕ1,pi(p¯, p¯ ω1), ϕ2,pi∗(p¯, p¯ ω2)) is an equilibrium allocation.
2
Clearly, a converse of Theorem 1 in the sense that for given ω only REVORD prices constitute
equilibrium prices is not true. According to Lemma 1 condition REVORD is equivalent to
obtaining orders of demand that are inverse to each other. Yet, excess demand (which depends
on p) is zero as long as there are no inconsistencies in the orders up to the place, where budgets
are spent. For those objects that are not demanded due to budget constraints, a consistency of
the ordering is not required. Thus, condition REVORD can be violated without losing existence
of equilibria.
Although there are possibly multiple equilibrium allocations attached to the same equilibrium
price system, utility allocations in equilibrium only depend on the price system. Also, the
chosen order in Πi(p¯) does not alter resulting utilities.
2er denotes the r-th unit vector in RK .
3In the first case, none of the objects has to be split.
8Lemma 2
Let p ∈ ∆, i ∈ {1, 2} and pi, p¯i be in Πi(p). Then for any initial allocation (ω1, ω2), we obtain
U i(ϕi,pi(p, p ωi)) =
∑
k∈K
(ϕi,pi(p, p ωi))k u
i(k) =
∑
k∈K
(ϕi,p¯i(p, p ωi))k u
i(k) = U i(ϕi,p¯i(p, p ωi)).
The straightforward proof is omitted.
4 Market Procedures
In this section we use a market mechanism to solve the objects division problem. The basic idea
is to determine a price system that satisfies the REVORD condition. Both agents are initially
endowed with either fractions of objects or, equivalently, income. By maximizing individual
utility with given prices an equilibrium allocation prevails. We will see that specific prices will
result in equilibrium allocations that implement specific bargaining solutions. Thus, we get a
decentralization of the conflict and a perspective bargaining solution through prices.
The basic procedure to solve the division conflict is as follows:
The Market Procedure (basic version):
Step 1: Assign to each object k a price pk, so that the price system p satisfies condition
REVORD.
Step 2: Compute the total value (at prices p) of the set of objects, i.e. M :=
∑
k∈K pk · 1.
Divide the total amount M among the agents as income m1 and m2, respectively.
Step 3: Let each agent “buy” goods according to prices p until no money is left over.
By Theorem 1 we know that the final allocation of objects will be an equilibrium allocation
of the corresponding market. Therefore, the outcome of this procedure will be an efficient
allocation of the goods in K.
In the following, we will use this procedure to provide implementation results for three bar-
gaining solutions: the Perles-Maschler, Kalai-Smorodinsky and discrete Raiffa solution. For
the Perles-Maschler solution, we have to apply the above procedure once, whereas the latter
bargaining solutions are obtained by iterating the procedure finitely many often.
94.1 The Perles-Maschler Procedure
The bargaining solution introduced by Perles & Maschler (1981b) (hereafter PM solution)
is known to be the only superadditive bargaining solution for two person bargaining games.
Superadditivity roughly says that the bargaining solution of a sum of bargaining problems gives
each party at least as much utility as the sum of solutions will provide for him. Perles (1982)
showed that the superadditivity axiom is incompatible with the presence of more than two
persons.4
For the class of object division problems, we can get an implementation result for the PM
solution by using the above discussed basic market procedure. For this, we will examine a
specific price system pPM ∈ ∆. Clearly, in order to satisfy condition REVORD, the price of
an object has to be between the agents’ valuations. We define pPMk to be the (normalized)
geometric mean of agents’ valuations.
Lemma 3
The price system pPM ∈ ∆ defined by pPMk :=
√
u1(k)u2(k)∑
j∈K
√
u1(j)u2(j)
(k ∈ K) satisfies REVORD.
Proof:
Take arbitrary pi ∈ Π1(pPM). We show pi∗ ∈ Π2(pPM). Since pi ∈ Π1(pPM) we have for j, k ∈ K
pi∗(k) > pi∗(j)⇐⇒ pi(k) < pi(j)⇐⇒ u
1(k)
pk
≥ u
1(j)
pj
⇐⇒ u
1(k)√
u1(k)u2(k)
≥ u
1(j)√
u1(j)u2(j)
⇐⇒
√
u1(k)u2(k)
u2(k)
≥
√
u1(j)u2(j)
u2(j)
⇐⇒ u
2(k)
pk
≤ u
2(j)
pj
,
which shows pi∗ ∈ Π2. The remaining implication runs analogously. 2
From Lemma 1 and Theorem 1 we know that pPM constitutes an equilibrium price system.
Hence, we get a solution for the division problem. What are the properties of this solution? It
is obvious that the allocation is efficient and gives both agents a higher utility than the initial
allocation.
Yet, conflicts may arise when parties do not want to bargain over the whole set of objects but
want to split it into several smaller sets and reach an agreement for each set separately. It is well
known that the resulting division is in general not Pareto efficient. Moreover, certain solution
4He showed that there is no superadditive solution on the whole class of compactly generated bargaining
problems.
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concepts or procedures may favor one of the agents. For example, by using the “Adjusted Win-
ner” procedure (cf. Brams & Taylor (1996)) or equivalently the Kalai-Smorodinsky bargaining
solution (cf. Kalai & Smorodinsky (1975)), some agent prefers to determine the solution of the
whole problem, whereas the other prefers to split the problem. However, our procedure with
prices pPM will avoid such a conflict. In fact, the solution concept generated by our procedure
satisfies the superadditivity property.
Let E be a market with object set K and let {K1, . . . , KL} be a partition of K into L nonempty
subsets. By E l we denote the sub-market for objects Kl. Utility functions, denoted U i,l, are
corresponding restrictions of U i. Initial endowments are also split canonically, i.e. ω1,lk = ω
1
k for
k ∈ Kl.
Theorem 2
Let E be a market for objects in K.
(i) Let E l (l ∈ L) be sub-markets of E for objects in Kl. Then we obtain for i = 1, 2 and
pi ∈ Πi(pPM)
(4) U i(ϕi,pi(pPM , pPM ωi)) ≥
L∑
l=i
U i,l(ϕi,pi(pPM , pPM ωi,l)).
(ii) Let V E denote the bargaining problem arising from E and let ω¯1 = ω¯2 = (1
2
, . . . 1
2
) ∈ RK
be equal initial endowment. Then
(
U1(ϕ1,pi(pPM , pPM ω¯1), U2(ϕ2,pi(pPM , pPM ω¯2)
) ∈ R2
coincides with the Perles-Maschler bargaining solution of V E .
Proof:
By Lemma 2 it suffices to show (4) for some piΠi(pPM). Note that the allocations in the sub
market form an allocation in E , since ∑i=1,2∑Ll=1 ϕi,l,pi(pPM , pPM ωi,l) =∑i=1,2 ωi. Therefore,
we only have to show that this allocation is affordable for both agents. Observe that for a good
k ∈ Kl we obtain
pPMk =
√
u1(k) · u2(k)∑
j∈K
√
u1(j) · u2(j) =
∑
j∈Kl
√
u1(j) · u2(j)∑
j∈K
√
u1(j) · u2(j) ·
√
u1(k) · u2(k)∑
j∈Kl
√
u1(j) · u2(j) =: T
l · pPM,lk .
Now, we compute
pPM
(
L∑
l=1
ϕi,l,pi(pPM,l, pPM,lωi,l)
)
=
L∑
l=1
T lpPM,lϕi,l,pi(pPM,l, pPM,lωi,l) =
L∑
l=1
T lpPM,lωi,l = pPMωi.
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Because pPM is an equilibrium price, ϕi,pi(pPM , pPM ωi) maximizes agent i’s utility in his budget
set and since utilities are additively separable, this shows (4).
We now show the second part. For the market E let µ(E) be the utility allocation in equilibrium
with identical endowments and relative to prices pPM . It is straightforward to see, that for two
markets E , E ′ with V E = V E ′ we obtain µ(E) = µ(E ′) =: µ˜(V E). Hence, µ depends only on the
associated bargaining problem (take the standard representation). µ(E) is feasible, individual
rational and Pareto optimal in V E . Moreover, it is symmetric, since the price system pPM is
invariant under relabelings the agents’ names. Finally, any positive linear transformation of
utility functions does not alter equilibrium allocations. Linearity of utility functions on X
K
implies that µ˜ is covariant with (affine) linear transformations of utility. Hence, µ˜ constitutes
a bargaining solutions on U . To show superadditivity of µ˜ take V E ∈ U . Any decomposition of
V E into V 1, V 2 ∈ U with V 1 + V 2 = V E can be associated with a subdivision of E into E1 and
E2 such that V i = V Ei (i = 1, 2) holds (take as E i, e.g., the standard market arising from V 1).
The first part shows superadditivity of µ˜ on U , i.e. µ˜(V E) ≥ µ˜(V E1) + µ˜(V E2). Therefore, µ˜
has to coincide with the only superadditive solution on U , namely the Perles-Maschler solution.
Note that partitioning K into sub-bundles may involve splitting of goods. 2
Indeed, inequality (4) shows the following. Consider any finite set of object markets with
object sets, say
{
K1, . . . KL
}
. Let ψ(Kl) be the utility allocation, arising from application of
the market procedure on the set Kl at prices pPM and equal endowments. Clearly, ψ(Kl) is a
Pareto efficient point in the induced bargaining problem V l. Then (4) says that the inequality
ψ(
⋃L
l=1K
l) ≥ ∑Ll=1 ψ(Kl) has to hold. Hence, the bargaining solution ψ has to obey the
superadditivity axiom and therefore coincides with the PM solution.
In case there is an agreement on dividing the objects by using prices pPM , then the superaddi-
tivity property guarantees that neither of the parties would want to split the whole bundle of
objects and proceed with the sub-bundles separately by using pPM prices.
Example 1
Suppose agents’ evaluations are as follows:
Good u1k u
2
k pk
u1k
pk
u2k
pk
Ranks 1 Ranks 2
A 4 1 2 2 1
2
1 5
B 9 4 6 3
2
2
3
2 4
C 3 3 3 1 1 3,4 2,3
D 5 5 5 1 1 3,4 2,3
E 2 8 4 1
2
2 5 1
2
6
5
4
3 PM Solution
0
associated
bargaining problem
utility agent 2
C
D
B
A
E
utility
agent1
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HereM = 20 and with equal division ofM agent 1 receives goods 1, 2 and 2
3
of good 3, whereas
agent 2 receives goods 5, 4 and 1
3
of good 3. This is precisely the Perles-Maschler solution of
the associated bargaining problem. 2
4.2 The Discrete Raiffa Procedure
Considering the equilibrium price condition REVORD once again, the simplest way to fulfill
it is to set prices by either pˆ1k := u
1(k)/(
∑
j u
1(j)) or pˆ2k := u
2(k)/(
∑
j u
2(j)). In this case the
utility per dollar always equals one for some agent and the equilibrium allocation is basically
determined by the other agent’s demand. Moreover, we can determine agent i’s utility in
equilibrium at prices pˆi.
Lemma 4
In the outcome of the market procedure with prices pˆi and initial incomes m1,m2 the utility
allocation for agent i is m
1
m1+m2
·∑k∈K ui(k).
Proof:
Use the fact that agent i’s ratio u
i(k)
pˆik
is constant across objects and equals 1. 2
The following procedure runs in different rounds. After each round a subset of objects is
allocated to the two agents, which remains in their possession during the course of the procedure.
However, this could involve splitting an object and allocating a fraction of, say λ, it to an agent.
The remaining fraction will be allocated in subsequent rounds. Therefore, we want to view this
remaining fraction of an object as a (complete) object: this is done by multiplying agents’
utilities for this object by 1− λ.
As we will now see, the market procedure with likewise prices pˆ1 and pˆ2 allows us to determine
the discrete Raiffa solution, which was introduced in Raiffa (1953)5. For this, consider following
iterative market procedure:
The Discrete Raiffa Procedure:
Step 0: Define K0 := K and z0,1 = z0,2 := 0 ∈ XK0 .
We describe how to proceed in round r+1 assuming that the set of objects Kr is “on the
table”.
5An approximative implementation of the discrete Raiffa Solution can be found in Myerson (1991). Trockel
(2004) gives an axiomatization of this bargaining solution
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Step r+1 a: Define quantities M r,i :=
∑
k∈Kr u
i(k) for i = 1, 2. Apply the Market Procedure
to Kr with prices pˆ1 and initial endowments m1 = m2 = 1
2
M r,1. This results in an
allocation (xr,1, xr,2).
Step r+1 b: Run the Market Procedure with interchanged roles resulting in an allocation
(yr,1, yr,2).
Step r+1 c: Assign to agent i all (fractions of) objects in Kr that he receives in xi and in yi,
i.e., assign zr+1,1 := xr+1,i ∧ yr+1,i (i = 1, 2).
Denote the remaining set of objects by Kr+1 and start with step r + 2, if Kr+1 is not
empty. Otherwise the procedure is finished.
Theorem 3
The outcome of the discrete Raiffa procedure is well defined. Moreover, the utility allocation
in its outcome coincides with the symmetric discrete Raiffa bargaining solution.
Proof:
By Lemma 4, the bundle that is assigned to agent i in Step 1 exactly gives him one half of what
he thinks the whole setK is worth. Denote the resulting utilities by wi = U i(z1,i) (i = 1, 2). The
bargaining problem arising fromK1 after Step 1, is given by the set V 1 := compH(V K−w)∩R2+).
Now the previous step is applied to K1, resp. V 1. This exactly mimics the construction of the
discrete Raiffa solution (in utility space). Therefore, the outcome in utility is well-defined,
i.e., the sequence ((U1(
∑r
s=1 z
s,1), U2(
∑r
s=1 z
s,2)))r=0,1,2,... converges (for r → ∞) to a Pareto
efficient point in V E . 2
Note that it could happen, that the discrete Raiffa solution is not achievable in a finite number
of steps. However, a closer look reveals that this is only the case, when there is a symmetric
two objects problem left over, which means Kr = {j, k} and ui(j) = u3−i(k) (i = 1, 2). In that
case the procedure could be stopped immediately by assigning and either of the objects should
be assigned to that agent that values it most. This means, we could extend the description of
the procedure, so that it always runs through at most finitely many rounds.
4.3 The Kalai-Smorodinsky Procedure
In the discrete Raiffa procedure, the solution is reached by iteratively assigning bundles to the
agents, so that each gets a half share (in utility) of the present object set. In terms of the
markets behind, this is achieved by assigning half split of the total value as incomes. Thereby,
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the ratio of agent 2’s utility gain to agent 1’s utility gain does in general differ from round to
round.
In the Kalai-Smorodinsky bargaining solution (see Kalai & Smorodinsky (1975) as well as
Raiffa (1953)) the ratio of assigned utilities equals the ratio of maximal possible utilities. This
ratio occurs (in general) only in the first step of the discrete Raiffa procedure. However, with
appropriate adjustments of income during the course of the procedure, we can end up with the
Kalai-Smorodinsky solution.
The Kalai-Smorodinsky Procedure:
Step 0: Define K0 := K and z0,1 = z0,2 := 0 ∈ XK0 .
Again, we describe how to proceed in round r + 1 assuming that the set of objects Kr is
“on the table”.
Step r+1 a: Define quantities M r,i :=
∑
k∈Kr u
i(k) for i = 1, 2 and denote by γ the ration
γ := M
0,2
M0,1
. Apply the Market Procedure to Kr with prices pˆ1 and initial endowments
m1 = M
r,2
γ Mr,1+Mr,2
M r,1 and m2 :=M r,1 −m1. This results in an allocation (xr,1, xr,2).
Step r+1 b: Run the Market Procedure with interchanged roles resulting in an allocation
(yr,1, yr,2). Initial incomes are here m2 := γ M
r,1
γ Mr,1+Mr,2
M r,2 and m1 :=M r,2 −m2.
Step r+1 c: Assign to agent i all (fractions of) objects in Kr that he receives in xi and in yi,
i.e., assign zr+1,1 := xr+1,i ∧ yr+1,i (i = 1, 2).
Denote the remaining set of objects by Kr+1 and start with step r + 2, if Kr+1 is not
empty. Otherwise the procedure is finished.
Theorem 4
The Kalai-Smorodinsky procedure is well defined. Moreover, the utility allocation in its out-
come coincides with the Kalai-Smorodinsky bargaining solution of the underlying bargaining
problem.
Proof:
Similar to the proof of Theorem 3 the procedure mimics one way to construct the KS solution.
Therefore we have to show that the ratio of utility gains in each round is constant and equals
the ratio M
0,2
M0,1
. To see this, consider the object division problem in Step r+1. According to
Lemma 4, agent 1’s additional utility is exactly m1 as specified in Step r+1 a, whereas player
2’s utility gain is m2 as specified in Step r+1 b. Therefore, the gain ratio amounts to
m2
m1
=
γ Mr,1
γ Mr,1+Mr,2
M r,2
Mr,2
γ Mr,1+Mr,2
M r,1
= γ =
M0,2
M0,1
.
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This means, the ratio of utility gains in each step is constant and equals the ratio of maximal
possible utilities in V E . Therefore, all intermediate utility allocation (and hence the one in the
outcome of the procedure) exhibit a ratio of M
0,2
M0,1
, which shows that the final utility allocation
coincides with the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution. Note that the sequence of aggregated utility
allocations (U i(
∑r
s=1 z
r,i))r=0,1,2... (i = 1, 2) is strictly monotonic (in R2) and therefore has to
converge to a Pareto efficient point in V E . 2
Like the discrete Raiffa procedure, this procedure may not converge in finitely many steps.
Again, this only happens, when the final solution does not involve splitting of a good. In
that case, similar symmetries hold for the last two goods, i.e., Kr = {i, j} with u2(j)/u1(j) <
u2(k)/u1(k) and u2(k) = γ u1(j). Here we can terminate the procedure immediately by assign-
ing good j to agent 1 and good k to agent 2. Hence, the Kalai-Smorodinsky procedure only
requires finitely many steps.
5 Conclusions
The assumption that agents’ utilities over fractions of objects are linear can be further weakened.
For an object one can specify a number of possible splits and then treat these splits separately.
For example, an agent may live in an apartment only for a couple of months a year. In the rest
of the year the other agent may move in. Then agents shall announce their utility of having the
object for k months. Equivalently we can view this as having created 12 objects instead of one.
The new objects are titled having the apartment for one, two, three, ... months. Application
of the market procedure may then result in sharing the apartment by 5 to 7 months. However,
in the new structure, this is not considered as splitting the apartment (one has not split one of
the new objects).
In the same way we can solve decision processes over finitely many issues, for each of which an
option has to be chosen. A discussion on the structure of such problems is found in Raith &
Welzel (1998).
Asymmetries among the agents can be incorporated in the procedure in two ways. First,
the assigned income (or initial endowment) can be unequally distributed, so that the market
procedure itself will apparently benefit one agent. Second, the chosen price system may reflect
an asymmetry among the agents. Obviously, the price systems pˆ1, which was used to implement
the discrete Raiffa and the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution, will not yield a symmetric solution.
This means the choice of object prices is not independent of the agents’ labels. This is not the
case for the price system pPM and hence we obtain a symmetric bargaining solution. Another
choice for a “symmetric price” would be pk := min(u
1(k), u2(k)), which satisfies REVORD and
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therefore results in a symmetric solution on U .
A simple consideration shows, that all outcomes of the market procedure with equal endowments
satisfy the envy-freeness property. Each agent is endowed with what he thinks is worth half of
the whole set of objects. In equilibrium, he will be at least as good off as his initial endowment,
hence he does not want to change his assignment with the one of his counterpart. In terms of
bargaining solutions, this is exactly the midpoint domination property. Each agent receives at
least one half of his maximal possible utility.
The case of bargaining problems that are represented as a finite sum of arbitrary6 bargaining
problems is treated in Ervig & Haake (2003). Here a notion of bargaining weight that can be
traded is established. In the present context this directly translates into shares of a good that
can be traded on the market. There it turns out that the Perles-Maschler solution is the only
bargaining solution being consistent with decentralized trade of weights.
Last, one can regard (equilibrium) prices as valuation of an object. Because to each object
there is an associated bargaining problem that is generated by a “triangle” in R2, we may think
of generating a measure on the class of triangular bargaining problems and hence on U as it is
generated by triangular bargaining problems. Clearly, the “price”, or “measure” of an object
should not depend on how the whole set of objects looks like. The normalization problem (here
the sum of prices have to be 1) can be solved by adding an extra object, which is valued 1 by
both agents, and the price of which is normalized to 1. So the unit simplex serves as reference
bargaining problem. Having such a measure, say ψ, on U , one can define a bargaining solution
(w.r.t. ψ) as the unique point on the boundary, for which the “bargaining problem above this
point” has the same measure as the one “below”. Desirable properties for bargaining solutions
then translate in properties the measure (or price) has to satisfy. The price pPM does satisfy all
properties for a defining a bargaining solution in this way, namely the Perles-Maschler solution.
In this spirit, we may consider the market approach discussed in this paper as a justification
for the measure used to construct the PM solution.
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